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N my letter accepting the invitation to participate in this symposium, I ex-
pressed surprise that the subject of a "Contract Nondiscrimination Clause"
was considered as a "supplementary or non-enforcement" kind of activity. My
experience leads me to the conclusion that proper administration of a nondis-
crimination clause is a most effective and efficient method of enforcement. In
fact, it is the most effective tool that I have ever used.
Mr. Conway has presented a most careful analysis and performed a real
service to all of us in his documentation of the legal authority for and the
reasons why states and cities should include a clause in contracts. He has also
stated that his only experience had been with a state that had a Commission'
and staff working on the problem of enforcement. Madison Jones stated that his
Commission had not been able to do much about the contract clause because of
insufficient resources which prevented them from getting around to it. My ten
years' experience in Pittsburgh is precisely that of Madison Jones. My time
and that of the staff was taken up with the investigation and processing of
complaint cases. That is all we could do with the manpower and budgetary re-
sources available to us. My first point, therefore, is that we will have to re-
direct current resources or find new ones to do what needs to be done in con-
tract compliance.
The clause in the New York State contracts seems to have a contradiction
between the first part and the procedural section, F. The first part requires
compliance in an affirmative manner and requires the contractor to do more
than just refrain from overt discriminatory action. When you get to the pro-
cedural clause, it has a sentence which seems to throw the whole thing back
into the complaint frame of reference. The disturbing sentence reads, "After
conciliation efforts by the Commission have failed to achieve compliance with
the nondiscrimination clause and after a verified complaint has been filed with
the Commission." I find that in dealing with legal documents that a few words
in a sentence can alter the whole tone of the document. To me, and I could be
wrong, my interpretation of this sentence says, when you get right down to
the enforcement stage, you have to have a verified complaint. The question
would be, "is the contract clause enforceable without a verified complaint?" If
not, we are right where we started.
My theory of what is required in terms of administering a contract clause
is "surveillance." You live with the contractor during the life of the contract;
you don't just go in one time and look at the pattern and come out and mark
him A, B, C, D or F. You go in as often as you can, certainly not less than
once a year for every contractor and more often for those that require ii, de-
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pending upon the circumstances. This requires staff and budget or you just
cannot do it.
The Air Force has thirty persons on a staff administering a contract
clause on equal employment opportunity. Six of them are assigned to com-
plaint investigations, four to top level administration, and the rest are all in
contractor surveillance without any complaint. This ratio is not necessarily
one that I would approve of, but it is required because of the number of com-
plaints we have to handle. We are spending too much of our time and resources
on these complaints.
I wish that Herbert Hill had not left the room. He says that he has 900
complaints with the President's Committee. Of course, the President's Com-
mittee gives those complaints to the agencies to investigate and resolve and
I've had 200 of these each year since I have been with the Air Force. About
three-fourths of the complaints we get have been stimulated by Herbert Hill.
I want him to cut it out. It is not profitable. We're wasting our time and
money and our resources in the investigation of these complaints. I could take
these same staff people and put them into the contractor surveillance program
and get results. The Air Force has actually assisted in the employment and
upgrading of thousands of minority workers in new categories under the sur-
veillance program whereas it is a mere handful that result from the complaint
investigation. I am quite opposed to the idea of going out and beating the
bush or in any way encouraging more complaints. You just continue the prac-
tice of dissipating the resources of commissions which are already understaffed
and underbudgeted for this kind of program.
Mr. Conway's comment about his experience being limited to Commission
operated programs, leads me to say that I do not think it would be helpful to
have a nondiscrimination clause in a contract unless there were enforcement
possibilities. The head of a department entering into a contract is not interested
in employment opportunity for minority workers. He is interested solely in ob-
taining the product or securing the services or getting the construction com-
pleted on schedule. I would go along with the thesis that if there is a clause in the
contract, one would have to have an administrative agency to do the checking,
making appraisals, and otherwise seeing to it that the contractor lived up to
the clause requirements.
Madison Jones has presented quite an imposing list of requirements with
emphasis upon affirmative action and initiative on the part of the contractor.
He has been very detailed and specific in his list of requirements. In general,
I would oppose efforts to try to come up with a check list of requirements,
especially in the affirmative action field. The factors in any situation vary so
greatly that they are not amenable to a standard remedial action. What we
are dealing with here is finding ways and means of breaking with traditional
customs and practices of long standing. The intensity of feeling about changing
patterns varies from one section of the country to another, from community
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to community, factory to factory, and department to department, and the
degree and extent of affirmative action varies with each individual situation.
Government, in contract matters, should consider itself a customer instead
of an enforcement agency. The "customer is always right" and therefore, any
interpretation of the requirements by the customer is the one that should
prevail.
The strong actions proposed by Madison Jones are certainly in agreement
with the times in which we live today. I think we have all recognized that we
have moved from a period of time when as commissions we have been emphasiz-
ing color blindness to a period of color consciousness. Contractors, however,
have not yet, quite, got used to the idea of our change of thinking. They are
worried about the fact that we have become color conscious. The fact is, if
you're not really conscious of what the problem is, you can't analyze it and
you are not going to resolve it.
Except in the area of "affirmative action," I think the contract clause
should be specific in terms of the requirements and expectations. The New
York contract clause is very good. The clause should provide for inspection
of records. This is important because the records provide the basic source of in-
formation and can be secured without subpoena. I see no reason why the
clause should be effective only for contracts above a certain amount of money
or based upon the number of employees in an establishment. I notice that the
New York contract has avoided these limitations.
Now, I have already made the point that the contract clause requires
surveillance. It is my opinion, and it is based upon several years of experience,
that there is very little overt, willful and deliberate discrimination on the part
of contractor management. What we are bucking here is tradition. The way we
have always done things is the way we want to continue doing them. To change,
means being resourceful and sometimes it means more expense. Change, fre-
quently brings trouble and this is certainly to be avoided. The only way to
root out these problems, and therefore resolve them, is to help the contractor
to identify them. This means surveillance.
The specialists employed by commissions must be able to analyze the
personnel actions and policy implementation programs of the contractor to
determine if and where these have resulted in exclusion of qualified workers
for reasons of race, creed, color or national origin. After that, these specialists
must be qualified to assist the contractor in affirmative action proposals so
that changes can be made. I say to the Air Force specialists, it is not enough
for you to point out the problems-you must show him how to resolve them.
Finally, repeating something I previously said, a nondiscrimination clause
is worth no more than the amount of surveillance you are going to be able to
give it and the amount of assistance you are going to be able to render. This
means sufficient resources and staff to do it.
PART III. DISCUSSION SUMMARY
The afternoon discussion centered on (1) methods of implementing pro-
grams requiring compliance with equal employment opportunity clauses in
government contracts, and (2) the role of private groups.
Contract Compliance Programs
In his comment, Mr. Culberson had discussed the contract compliance
procedures announced for New York State by Governor Rockefeller in Decem-
ber 1963, and pointed to a possible inconsistency between the requirement in
clause (a) that the contractor not only not discriminate but that he take affirma-
tive action, and the requirement in clause (f) of a verified complaint before a
contract is cut off for non-compliance with clause (a). The latter requirement
he considered appropriate for antidiscriminatory conduct but not for situations
where the contractor is required to take affirmative action, for which regular
and intense surveillance is necessary.
Commissioner Conway replied that there did seem to be a contradiction on
the surface, but the verified complaint procedure, which would probably be
initiated by the Attorney General, applies to the contractor who refuses to take
even the most minimal affirmative action possible to comply with the contract.
In sum, the contract clause sets up a two-pronged attack: (1) action under
both the antidiscrimination law and the contract if there is evidence of discrimi-
nation; and (2) action under the contract alone if there is no discrimination but
the contractor refuses to take any steps whatsoever to comply with the "affirma-
tive action" obligation under clause (a) of the contract.
In response to a question, Commissioner Conway noted that the statutory
"low bidder" requirement of many states was not really a problem in preventing
discriminatory contractors from getting or keeping state contracts, since the
New York requirement at least, was couched in terms of the "lowest qualified
bidder" and a discriminatory contractor would not be considered "qualified."
Professor Jaffe asked whether a reporting system might be instituted for.
each specific job when the work force was first assembled, whereby the employer
would report immediately on how many minority group members were employed.
This would avoid the difficulty of having to go to each employer to learn this
information. Although Commissioner Conway raised the possibility of employer
resistance to still another form to file, Mr. Culberson thought government con-
tracts should require such reports on a regular basis so that one could screen them
to pick out some for surveillance. These reports need not be monthly or even
quarterly, so long as they were regular. There had to be some way to start the
surveillance proceedings and such reports were one device; the President's
Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity used them. Mr. Jones also
approved of the suggestion, but pointed out that policing the accuracy and




Mr. Karpatkin noted that private and official groups could often cooperate
very effectively. In one case he related, a CORE chapter had managed to in-
crease the number of Negroes employed at a restaurant chain by staging a series
of demonstrations culminating in a sit-in, but some of the demonstrators were
arrested. At the initiative of counsel for the arrested demonstrators, the New
York City Commission was motivated to use its good offices with court and
prosecutor, thereby resulting in a dismissal of all charges. Thus the sit-in
resulted in both the amelioration of the discriminatory situation and the arrest
of the demonstrators. Throughout the demonstrations, the New York City
Commission played a significarft role in attempting to obtain voluntary com-
pliance from the employer. The negotiations resulted in a written agreement
satisfactory to the CORE people. But the nine pending criminal cases would
have remained as an unhappy residue of the otherwise successful project, had
it not been for the intelligent cooperation of private and public agencies.
Mr. Jones added that private business and trade groups could be more
effective if high public officials on each level of government were to meet with
such groups and to assume leadership in the civil rights struggle. Such meetings
should be held annually or biennially.
The discussion of private groups raised the problem of preferences, dis-
cussed at the Friday night session. Mr. Robison pointed out that although
governmental agencies can do a great deal for Negro job applicants and em-
ployees even without preferences, in order to redress past injustices, he felt
that sooner or later, such agencies would have to exercise such preferences,
even though they would never admit this openly. Mr. Karpatkin pointed out
that here the activity of private groups could supplement the work of govern-
mental agencies, for whereas the latter may not be able constitutionally to
require such preferences, private groups are under no such inhibition. Although
a good argument can be made, he thought, that no government agency may
constitutionally compel a preference based on race or color, it is quite another
thing for a private group to seek to influence the community and private em-
ployers to take realistic steps to redress past discriminatory practices. Any
paradox here is more imagined than real. There are many areas of conduct which
are quite blameless, and indeed sound public policy, for private persons to sup-
port, but which could not be compelled of government.
